Arming Local Groups to Support U.S. National Objectives: Assessing Potential Value and Risk

Source: Mark Grdovic Substack | May 14, 2026

Retired Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and Small Wars Journal contributor Mark Grdovic, in the debut post of his new Substack column, evaluates the viability of arming Iranian Kurdish groups as part of a current U.S. strategy to counter Iran. The following highlights key analytical points from his assessment.

Is This the Right Tool?

Grdovic proposes a set of criteria for evaluating whether to arm a local group:

1. Is the group's ideology compatible with U.S. values? (Is its battlefield conduct acceptable?)
2. Are its objectives aligned with U.S. goals? (Is it willing to become part of a future national government, or does it aspire to lead that government—or establish an entirely independent state?)
3. Does the group have capable local leadership?

The Diversity Within "the Kurds"

Grdovic cautions against treating Kurdish groups as a monolithic entity:

Talking about the Kurds as a single entity is like lumping together North Americans—Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans. Syrian Kurds, Iraqi Kurds, Turkish Kurds, and Iranian Kurds share some cultural similarities, but are in fact distinct groups that in some cases speak different languages.

Geographic Constraints

Grdovic underscores how ethnic boundaries limit strategic utility:

These groups' capabilities will largely be confined to their own ethnic homelands. After receiving support and achieving some operational results, there is a risk of miscalculation—by the group itself or its backers—that it can act like a "maneuver infantry" force beyond its traditional territory and base of popular support. This is precisely what happened in southern Afghanistan in 2001–2002: following the Northern Alliance's success in the north, there was an attempt to "manufacture" a Southern Alliance to replicate that success in the south. The results were disappointing.

No Guarantee of Future Alignment

Grdovic warns of the inherent unpredictability of such partnerships:

Another challenge with these operations is what happens if a favorable agreement is reached, or a more amenable government emerges, and the group you armed—originally intended for short-term tactical disruption—refuses to cooperate with the new order. In other words, when a government arms insurgents or separatists to pressure an adversary into concessions, and that goal is achieved but the armed group's own demands remain unmet, the operation comes into direct conflict with its original policy objectives.

Historical Mistakes and Their Consequences

Grdovic closes with a cautionary historical parallel—the abandonment of the Kurds after earlier U.S. covert support:

Shortly afterward, when Iran and Iraq reached an agreement, the U.S. was effectively forced to cut off all support, abandoning the Iraqi Kurds. When asked about the decision, Kissinger coldly remarked: "Covert action should not be confused with missionary work." Regardless of how one reads that statement—as morally repugnant or as cold-eyed realpolitik—the more important lesson is acknowledging the unintended second- and third-order effects of such actions. Abandoning the Iraqi Kurds (circa 1975) ultimately contributed to the rise of Saddam Hussein and destabilized the region for roughly 40 years.

Further Reading

Readers interested in the author's past work can consult his articles in Small Wars Journal:

• Untying the Gordian Knot of Irregular Warfare
• Special Forces Identity Crisis: Déjà Vu All Over Again

On Kurdish forces' innovations in drone tactics, see: Guerrillas with FPV Drones: What Ukraine's Battlefield Experience Means for Kurdish Warfare.

For a broader examination of the risks of hastily and covertly arming rebel groups, see: Covert Action in Irregular Warfare: Deconstructing Operation Timber Sycamore (2012–2017, Syria).

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