IISS Report: Russia Likely Using Shadow Fleet to Launch Drone Operations Against Europe
A new report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) assesses that Russia's Kremlin most likely conducted systematic drone operations against Europe between August 2024 and February 2026, using Russia-linked vessels and shadow fleet ships as launch and recovery platforms. The campaign spanned 144 incidents across 13 European countries, repeatedly forcing major airports to close, while Europe's existing counter-drone framework is assessed as inadequate to address the threat.

Highlights
- The IISS assessed that Russia most likely conducted 144 drone incidents across 13 European countries between August 2024 and February 2026, targeting military bases, airports, and critical infrastructure.
- Approximately 48% of sightings occurred over military facilities, including NATO nuclear-sharing sites Kleine-Brogel (Belgium) and Volkel (Netherlands) hosting U.S. B61-12 gravity bombs.
- On February 26, 2026, Swedish forces jammed a drone launched by the Russian signals intelligence vessel Zhigulevsk toward the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in Malmö — the only incident publicly attributed to a specific Russian platform.
- Monthly reported incidents surged from an average of 4 to 22.5 between September and December 2025, with Germany alone recording 58 sightings.
- Europe's planned 'Drone Wall' (European Drone Defence Initiative) targets initial operating capability by end-2026 but has no authority to act against vessels launching drones from international waters.
IISS Report: Russia Likely Using Shadow Fleet to Launch Drone Operations Against Europe
A new report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) assesses that Russia's Kremlin most likely conducted systematic drone operations against Europe between August 2024 and February 2026, concluding that Russia-linked vessels and shadow fleet ships very likely served as launch and recovery platforms for the drones.
The campaign repeatedly caused closures at major airports including Copenhagen, Brussels, Munich, Oslo, and Vilnius.
144 Incidents Concentrated Around Strategic Sites
The report, led by IISS Senior Research Fellow Charlie Edwards, compiled a dataset of 144 incidents across 13 European countries. Approximately 48% of sightings occurred over military facilities, 18% over civil airports, and 26% over critical infrastructure such as ports and energy installations. Between September and December 2025, monthly reported incidents surged from an average of 4 to 22.5. Germany alone recorded 58 sightings.
The pattern was particularly pronounced around nuclear deterrence infrastructure: Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium and Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands — both reportedly hosting U.S. B61-12 gravity bombs under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements — as well as France's ballistic missile submarine base at Île Longue, where five drones were detected on December 4, 2025.
The report does not claim that every sighting was genuine or directly orchestrated by Russia, and notes that no European government has publicly characterized the incidents as a coordinated Russian operation. Nevertheless, it argues that the overall pattern cannot be explained solely by misidentification, hobbyist activity, or opportunistic harassment.
Shadow Fleet Vessels as Launch Platforms
The IISS assesses that some incidents very likely involved drones launched and recovered from shadow fleet tankers, coastal freighters, and small vessels sailing close to European coastlines — ships that at times switched off their AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponders.
French naval special forces boarded a suspect vessel — the tanker Boracay — on September 28, 2025, and discovered two employees of a Russian private military company on board.
Danish media sources previously reported that the drone responsible for a four-hour flight disruption at Copenhagen Airport (CPH) on September 22, 2025, may have been transported to Denmark aboard a Russian vessel.
The most definitive confirmed case occurred on February 26, 2026, when Swedish military forces jammed a drone launched by the Russian signals intelligence ship Zhigulevsk toward the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle during a port visit to Malmö, Sweden. This remains the only incident publicly attributed to a specific Russian platform.
Europe's Counter-Drone Framework Fails to Address Maritime Threat
The report concludes that Europe's existing counter-drone architecture is insufficient to meet the current threat — detection capabilities are uneven, legal authorities are fragmented, and attribution is too slow to underpin deterrence. Despite the introduction of NATO's Operation Eastern Sentry and new shoot-down authorizations in Germany, Lithuania, and Romania, the report cautions governments against "conflating activity with effectiveness."
The European Drone Defence Initiative — informally dubbed the "Drone Wall" — aims to achieve initial operating capability by end of 2026, but the initiative can only intercept drones after they enter European airspace and currently holds no jurisdictional authority over vessels conducting launch operations in international waters.
The report's final conclusion is stark: as long as Russia-linked vessels can loiter freely in international waters and deploy drones with impunity, the core operating mechanism of the campaign remains intact.
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